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Competition strategies must adapt to the euro
by Richard Cordero
The devaluation of the Thai currency in 1997 was the triggering event lor the Asian financial crisis. For the oc* o countries in that region it is now too expensive to buy in
dollars, and American producers are hard-pressed to compete 
with imports priced in their cheap currencies. Consequently, 
last August saw one of the worst US trade deficits ever — almost 
$17 hillion. Now another earth-shaking currency event is about 
to hit companies in the US. It can be traced back to what US 
Secretary of Commerce William M Daley believes could prove 
the most significant development since the European 
Community was formed, namely, the introduction of the euro.
Indeed, the euro was ushered in on 1 Januarv 1999 in 11 of 
the 15 member states of the European Union (EU). It is now 
their official common single currency, available for buyer-seller 
agreed payment by cheque, credit card, or bank transfer. By 
contrast, the 10 national currencies of these euro-participating 
member states (Luxembourg does not have its own currency) 
are only sub-units of the euro. They are linked to it by 
permanently-fixed official conversion rates and, as a result, are 
also linked to each other by derived non-fluctuating rates. 
Consequently, those currencies are no longer quoted on 
currency exchanges, only the euro is, which has replaced the 
ECU on a one-to-one basis. On 1 January 2002, the euro will 
become legal tender and euro banknotes and coins will be 
issued, while those of the national currencies will begin to be 
withdrawn from circulation, a process to be concluded by 
30 lune 2002. at the latest. Among the currencies that will no-* ' o
longer be legal tender are those as important for international 
trade and financial transactions as the German mark, the French 
franc, and the Dutch guilder.
Thus, since January 1999, some 300 million people among 
those with the highest purchasing power on earth have the euro 
as their official currency. They are expected to save over $30 
billion annuallv on matters such as foreign exchange./ o o
commissions, hedging cost, and the management of complex 
multi-currency treasuries, accounting systems and price lists. 
For the same reasons of savings and convenience, many more 
million business people will decide privately to use this new 
currency in their business dealings. They are citizens of 
countries whose dominant business partners are the 
participating member states, i.e. the other four member states, 
the 11 candidates for accession to the EU, the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific countries associated with the EU by the 
Lome Convention, and the countries in the Mediterranean basin 
tied to the EU by economic and commercial treaties.
All these core and peripheral countries \vill form the euro zone 
and give rise to the significantly most important trading block in 
the world. This is no exaggeration: the EU alone already 
accounts for 21% of world trade, followed by the US with 20% 
and Japan with 10%. With such a large economic basis ensuring 
its stability and acceptability, the euro is well poised to become 
the alternative currency for pricing international commodities 
such as oil, metals, and grains. Thus, this European single
common currency is bound to become a major international 
trading, securities denomination and reserve currency It simply 
cannot be ignored.
Tlet the overwhelming majority of companies in the US are 
unprepared for the euro. The US Commerce Department 
estimates that 20% of companies do not want anything to do 
with the euro, another 20% do not understand all its potential 
effects and the other 60% are still trying to get ready; only the 
very large companies have made considerable progress. Such 
unpreparedness could deal a fatal blow to companies already 
weakened by the economic and financial crisis not only in Asia, 
but also in Latin America and Russia. Worse still, the effects of 
euro-unpreparedness will be far more insidious.
This is so because the euro will undermine the 
competitiveness of companies in the US doing business with EU 
countries, whose economies are not only healthy, but some of 
which are also expanding. For these companies to strengthen 
their competitive position, much more than just lowering prices 
is necessary. Significant changes in key business areas are 
required. One of the most visible areas is information 
technology IT systems must be adapted to deal with a single 
currency rather than 10, in functions as vast and important as 
pricing, ordering, invoicing, and payments. Such adaptation 
entails rewriting existing or installing new software, and even 
upgrading or replacing hardware, in order to redesign or create 
new spreadsheets, identify all records with currency data and 
translate their currency values using a no-converse rate set and 
triangulation, etc. Even the installation of the euro symbol so 
that software applications and printers can use it may mean the 
difference between identifying figures as amounts in euros and 
making an accounting mess. IBM has estimated that just the IT 
adaptation to the euro will cost over $175 billion and be 
exceedingly more complex than fixing the ^ear 2000 problem! 
Adaptation also requires preparing euro price lists and 
catalogues and, of course, training all personnel to think in 
terms of the euro and to use any new euro IT systems.
None of these euro adaptation tasks can be handled by just 
hiring a couple — or even an army — of computer technicians. 
The latter cannot decide at what time during the three-year 
transition period the use of the euro will begin; nor for what 
transactions it will be used, nor by which customers from what 
date; whether dual pricing in dollars and euros will be adopted; 
whether bank accounts will be opened and, if so, where, or 
whether the company will rely on the obligation of banks in euro 
member states to convert free of charge between their national 
currency and the euro; whether securities will be 
redenominated or issued in euros, etc., etc., etc. The fact is that 
the euro raises a host of questions that can only be answered at 
a company's top echelons. Herein lies the crux of the matter: 
preparing for the euro is above all a matter of strategic planning 
because this new currency fundamentally changes the terms of 
competition. 27
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To realise the Rill scope of this competitive challenge, one 
must understand that the euro is only the most noticeable 
manifestation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
This union, built on top of the EU by the 11 participating 
member states, is based on rules aimed at fostering their' o
macro-economic convergence in the areas of inflation, budget 
deficits, national debt and interest rates. With economic 
fundamentals within the same order of magnitude, the EMU 
members can more readily level the field of competition for 
their sellers and buyers. For their part, the f f candidates to EU 
accession   as opposed to just their business people   strive 
after convergence because harmonising their economies with 
that of EMU enhances their chances of EU membership and of 
official participation in the euro system, while also shortening 
their transition period. The other peripheral countries naturally 
take into account the monetary and economic policies of their 
dominant economic partners, particularly since many of them 
have already pegged their currencies to either the pivotal 
German mark, the ECU (now replaced by the euro) or the 
French franc.
Hence, the introduction of the euro contributes to 
completing the integration of separate EU national markets into 
a single composite domestic market. It eliminates the cost of 
exchange transactions and hedging, which on average represents 
7% of a commercial transaction in the EU. That percentage is 
large enough to make the difference between being competitive 
and being priced out of the market. Moreover, the elimination 
of currency fluctuation risk constitutes a most powerful 
incentive for companies in one euro member state to sell or buy 
in the other euro member states or even open branches and 
subsidiaries there. A single currency resting on a very broad 
economic base fosters monetary stability and, by reducing the 
cost of doing business, stimulates competition in all the 
countries that officially or unofficially use the euro. That can set 
off a commercial turmoil.
So one day in the near future companies in the US will wake 
up only to realise that the nice little niche that they have carved 
out for themselves, let's say, in France, is now surrounded by a 
pack of hungry competitors from Finland, Austria, and Ireland! 
Are these companies going to call in computer 'techies' to 
rescue them? Of course not! Or it may dawn on them that 
entering into previously-avoided contractual relations with firms
in Italy, Portugal, or Spain is decidedly safer and, in principle, as 
safe as doing business in Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium. 
Then they will come under fire from all their current and 
potential business partners in the euro zone, who will ask them 
to do business in euros, and for good reason: the time has come 
for those partners to amortise the equivalent of billions of 
dollars that they have spent on becoming euro-ready by adapting 
their own business practices and systems to the new currency. 
Their sheer numbers could force companies in the US either to 
oblige them ... or resign themselves to being placed at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis more accommodating 
companies.
Confronting these competitive challenges and taking 
advantage of these new business opportunities are matters that 
only top executives can handle. They require strategic planning. 
They presuppose substantial knowledge of EU rules on the 
euro. They render indispensable the gathering and analysis of 
competitive intelligence on euro zone competitors that up to 
now were unheard of, or believed to be kept away by 
exchange-risk barriers too high for them to overcome. American 
executives have no choice but to take action   fast and strategic 
action. They must develop a competition plan and strategies for 
when, how, and to what extent to adopt the euro, whether to 
move from just exporting/importing activities to developing a 
physical presence in the euro zone and, if so, whether by a solo 
entry, a joint venture with an EU partner, or a toehold 
acquisition. Failure to plan and then prepare their systems and 
practices for increased competition generated by the euro could 
deal a devastating blow to their competitiveness. If these 
executives do not know how to become euro-ready, they had 
better ask for professional advice. Time is running out. @
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